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Monitoring the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is both
globally important and scientiﬁcally interesting. A dozen years after ﬁrst sig
natures, the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) established the
International Scientiﬁc Studies (ISS) project which called for technical papers
in eight areas: seismology; infrasound; hydroacoustics; radionuclide monitor
ing; atmospheric transport modeling; system performance; on-site inspection;
and data mining. The response for the June 2009 ISS Conference in Vienna
was large, 600 scientists from 99 nations contributed 236 papers, with over
50 invited speakers and panelists. Detect and Deter summarizes the current
and emerging technologies and capabilities for monitoring of underground, at
mospheric, and underwater nuclear explosions, as well as on-site inspections,
and the synergy with science and national perspectives as compared to in
ternational perspectives. Detect and Deter will serve as a valuable reference
on CTBT monitoring for scientists, diplomats, and the public. The results are
very encouraging and the science has progressed. Space limits this review to
just the topic of seismic detection.

SEISMIC DETECTION
At the time of signature, it was generally assumed that the Primary Seismic
Network of the International Monitoring System (IMS) would have a thresh
old magnitude mb of four for a well-coupled yield of about 1 kiloton at three
or more IMS primary stations with 90% probability of detection. Seismologists

expected it would be better than that, but they did not over-promise, awaiting
the results of construction and measurement. A half-dozen years after signa
ture, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences concluded that the limit for de
tection was 3.5 mb (about 0.1 kt) for Asia, Europe, North America, and North
Africa, a factor of ten lower in yield than the 1-kiloton level of 1996.1 This re
sult was conﬁrmed to good measure by the relative ease of detection for the
two nuclear tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The 9 Octo
ber 2006 test of 0.6–0.9 kt was detected with explosion-like characteristics at
22 IMS stations, as far away as South America, at a time when the IMS seis
mic network was only 60% completed. The 25 May 2009 test of 2.5–4.6 kiloton
was detected at 61 IMS stations. The International Data Centre provided es
timates for location and magnitude of the test within four hours, before DPRK
announced the test. Chemical tests of 0.002 kt (1.9 mb ) have been detected and
identiﬁed with explosive characteristics by Richards and Kim for the Korean
Peninsula, using data from four 1998 underground chemical tests at a distance
of 289 km.2
Detect and Deter gives evidence of further progress in monitoring the
CTBT. A good place to start is the work of Kværna and Ringdal (p. 42–46) in
which they use the individual characteristics of the IMS stations, which vary
as much as ,mb of 1.5 units, to determine network capabilities. Their results
in Figure 2.12 give a threshold of 3.4 mb for the Northern Hemisphere and 3.6
mb for the Southern Hemisphere for 90% detection with 3 or more stations.
But there are many thresholds to consider. If the probability of detection is
dropped to 10% detection with 3 or more stations, the threshold is lowered 0.4
units to 3.0 mb (0.03 kt) for the Northern Hemisphere and 3.2 mb (0.06 kt) for
the Southern Hemisphere. Ten percent detection may not seem good enough,
but ten percent detection at one-third the threshold yield would give cheaters
pause for concern. Ultimately 33 of the 50 Primary stations will be arrays
of up to 25 seismographs per station, further reducing noise and improving
location determinations. The P/S spectral ratios at frequencies above 6 Hz ef
fectively discriminate between earthquakes and explosions in most relevant
situations.

THRESHOLD DETECTION
Seismic signals at a few hundred km distance are much stronger than those
for similar events at 2000 km distance, and the knowledge of past regional
events can aid interpretation (Figure 2.9). If a nation wishes to monitor a par
ticular state, detection at lower magnitudes than those discussed above can be
achieved with the concept of “threshold monitoring” that uses previous seis
mic waveforms and relies on fewer stations for identiﬁcation. Detect and Deter
concludes the following (p. 47–48):

One might say that the requirement of detection at three stations or more is
too conservative, or stringent, in the sense that its applications does not show
the full potential of the network . . . . By subjecting the North Korean test site to
threshold monitoring, Kværna et al. (2007) conclude that, using data from the
IMS network available at the time of the test, this site can be monitored—in
the threshold monitoring sense—at the 90 percent probability level down to a
magnitude of between 2.3 and 2.5. This corresponds to explosive yields of only
about 10 tons for explosions in hard rock. Not surprising, use of data from the IMS
seismic array station in South Korea was essential in obtaining such low values
. . . . The threshold monitoring technique can be said to provide a more complete
picture of actual capabilities than the traditional approach based on detection at
three stations, and in that sense this technique represents an optimal use of the
available data . . . . Kværna et al. (2002) were able to continuously monitor Novaya
Zemlya during November and December 1997 down to magnitude 2 most of the
time, and were conﬁdent that no event exceeding magnitude 2.5 took place. Data
from non–IMS stations can be included in the analysis and this will contribute to
a further lowering of the detection threshold. These low thresholds will represent
a considerable deterrence to clandestine nuclear testing under the CTBT.

AUXILIARY AND GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK
Analysis of seismic traces from the world’s 16,000 reporting seismographs has
enhanced the interpretation of the closer, regional waves. The U.S. Geologi
cal Survey receives seismic waveforms from about 1,000 seismographs in near
real time. This data can be used in interpreting IMS data, but not directly used
by the International Data Centre. Clearly, more quality seismographs improve
CTBT data. The Auxiliary Network adds 120 stations to the 50 Primary sta
tions, increasing station density by a factor of 170/50, or 3.4. A simple calcu
lation shows that, on average, a network of 170 stations reduces the threshold
sensitivity by 0.25 mb for a further yield reduction of a factor of two. The Auxil
iary Network data is now used by the IDC in selective cases in the Late Event
Bulletin, further reducing threshold detection levels and improving location
estimates. Detect and Deter doesn’t allocate sufﬁcient credit for the use of the
Auxiliary Network. One can expect additional seismographs will lower thresh
olds further.

TESTING IN CAVITIES
Detect and Deter points out the following facts that make testing in a cav
ity risky. A decoupled cavity test will not produce a glass-sealed cavity that
blocks leakage of radioxenon, thus the cavity can enhance detection of xenon.
Six percent of ﬁssion fragments become 133Xe at the rate of 1022/kt. “A 1 per
cent release from an underground explosion is one to two orders of magnitude
larger than the daily release from a large isotope production plant.” (p. 67). The

40 IMS xenon stations can be supplemented by national xenon stations on the
ground, as Sweden did next to the DPRK in 2006, or by nearby aircraft. In ad
dition, the lowered thresholds for seismic detection, discussed above, force the
violator to test at very low yields; a 1-kt test with a reduction of a factor of 70
(less at higher frequencies) could be a signiﬁcant risk for a small explosion. In
addition, a ﬁrst-time testing nation would not know the yield of the device and
would risk an excess yield that could be detected, knowledge that is available
to nations that have tested underground.

PRECISION MONITORING
Detect and Deter concludes that a new integrated approach should be imple
mented to take full advantage of the information in seismic waveforms (p. 85):
Conﬁdent discrimination between explosions and earthquakes, especially for
smaller events, must be approached on a regional scale . . . .The fact that less than
half of the events reported by PTS can be screened out as earthquakes illustrates
that characterization using globally applicable procedures is unsuccessful. A re
gional approach is needed for event characterization, optimum detection, and lo
calization . . . .The existing methods and procedures for seismological data analy
sis used by the PTS date back almost three decades, and the time has come to
create a new paradigm for such analysis. Developments in data analysis and ex
ploitation have created the tools needed to form a new and integrated approach to
the detection, location, and characterization of seismic events using data from the
rapidly expanding data resources available from regional and global networks.

CONCLUSION
Detect and Deter analyzes the evolving Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test
Ban science and gives direction to future improvements. It fulﬁlled its goal
by reviewing the work of world-wide experts and presenting the results of the
ISS project in a clearly understandable fashion. The results are impressive.
Any serious reviewer of CTBT monitoring had best read Detect and Deter and
the ISS papers.3
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